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Episteme Symposium on Group Agency 
Replies to Gaus, Cariani, Sylvan, and Briggs1 
Christian List and Philip Pettit 
Episteme 9(3), September 2012 
 
Reply to Gaus 
 
The central theme of Gerald Gaus’s commentary is the understanding of rationality 
underlying our book. His discussion is framed around the contrast between classical, 
universalist understandings of rationality, and their more recent, psychologically and 
evolutionarily informed rivals. He calls the former “constructivist” and the latter 
“ecological”. He argues that our book is firmly grounded in a classical, constructivist 
understanding, and that this, in turn, makes it vulnerable to a number of criticisms. In 
particular, he argues that, despite our acknowledgment that there is no “one size fits all” 
organizational design for a group agent, our theory gives insufficient attention to the 
context-specificity of the rationality requirements a group agent should satisfy – 
something he suggests would be better captured by an ecological approach.  
 
In this reply, we first explain how we see the distinction between “classical” and 
“ecological” understandings of rationality and relate the distinction to our project. We 
then address two of Gaus’s more specific criticisms: his criticism of the claim that group 
agents must satisfy “robust group rationality” (which, technically, subsumes “universal 
domain” and “collective rationality”), and his criticism that our judgment-aggregation 
analysis relies on a problematic assumption, which he calls “proposition 
pluralism/structure monism”. We conclude with some brief remarks about the theme of 
group emotions, which Gaus raises in his final section. 
 
We should clarify one point at the outset. Gaus, like some other commentators, attributes 
to us a “general though qualified support for premise-based decision-making as the 
preferred way to cope with the problems of judgment aggregation”. Although we may 
have become associated with a premise-based approach because of the attention we have 
given it in earlier work, it was never intended to be the only, or even the default, method 
for arriving at rational collective judgments. It is merely a particularly simple – but also 
rather inflexible – instance of an aggregation function that illustrates some of our theory’s 
central points, especially the failure of propositionwise supervenience between individual 
and group attitudes. As we discuss in the book, real-world group agents should be 
expected to employ more complex and less mechanical methods of aggregation (e.g., GA, 
60-62). 
 
With this caveat in place, let us turn to Gaus’s central theme, the contrast between 
classical and ecological understandings of rationality. For present purposes, the classical 
understanding is the one underlying standard normative decision theory (on the practical 
side) and Bayesian epistemology (on the theoretical one) – or perhaps more sophisticated 
                                                
1 We are grateful to Alvin Goldman for organizing this symposium and for helpful discussions, and to 
Rachael Briggs, Fabrizio Cariani, Gerald Gaus, and Kurt Sylvan for their thoughtful and generous 
comments on our book. In references to our book, the abbreviation GA stands for Group Agency. 
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versions of those theories. The ecological understanding of rationality has recently been 
championed by psychologists such as Gerd Gigerenzer. Gigerenzer and others (e.g., 
2000) have argued that many behaviours and human decision heuristics that at first sight 
seem to violate classical conditions of rationality are in fact highly adaptive responses to 
certain environmental conditions. A nice example is given by the “recognition heuristic”. 
When asked which of a given pair of cities is larger – for instance, San Diego or San 
Antonio – many people simply name the city they recognize. At first sight, this sounds 
irrational, since recognition has little to do with size. But Goldstein and Gigerenzer 
(2002) point out that in many human environments the frequencies with which certain 
cities are mentioned – say, in the media or in conversations – are very good proxies for 
their sizes. And indeed, they report the striking finding that, “[d]espite a considerable 
lack of knowledge, 100% of the Germans [in their study] answered the question [about 
the relative sizes of San Diego and San Antonio] correctly”. Americans did less well 
under the same heuristic, since more of them recognized both cities. This illustrates that, 
although the recognition heuristic is not unconditionally rational in the classical sense, it 
is rational in certain environments, namely those to which it is adapted. This is what is 
meant by calling it “ecologically rational”. Gigerenzer and others take these insights to 
challenge the classical idea of rationality itself.  
 
We think, however, that this interpretation is a mistake. The notion of ecological 
rationality can be easily reinterpreted as a version of classical rationality, relativized to a 
particular context or set of environmental constraints. Once we specify the target 
environment in which the recognition heuristic is to be employed, including relevant 
informational and computational constraints, this heuristic may well be the most 
classically rational procedure for comparing city sizes. Classical statistics, for example, 
might tell us that, given a limited data set containing little information about city sizes in 
a foreign country, the frequency with which we have heard of the relevant cities is the 
best predictor of their sizes. In this sense, ecological rationality is simply classical 
rationality, conditional on a particular environment and set of constraints.   
 
What is the lesson of all this for Group Agency? We think that the criteria by which to 
assess the performance of a group agent – or indeed any agent, whether a human, a dog, 
or a robot – and which underlie our disposition to take an intentional stance towards it 
must ultimately be classical. It may just so happen that whether a particular 
organizational structure or agential constitution ensures the fulfillment of those criteria 
depends on the environment or context in question. Some organizational structures may 
facilitate a group’s rational performance in some environments but not in others, just as 
some robotic designs may lead a robot to behave rationally in some environments but 
lead to breakdowns in others. We touch on some of these issues in our discussion of 
feasible limits and favourable conditions in Chapter 1 of the book (especially GA, 20-21), 
though perhaps not in enough detail. The bottom line is that a group’s organizational 
structure may be adapted to some environments but not to others, and it may then be said 
to be ecologically rational in the former environments but not in the latter. What matters 
for the achievement of group agency, however, is still whether, in the relevant environment, 
the group behaves broadly rationally. It may just be that different organizational 
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structures are best suited for achieving this outcome in different environments, which is 
in line with our observation that there is no “one size fits all” organizational structure. 
 
We can now address some of Gaus’s more specific criticisms. The first is that the 
requirement of “robust group rationality”, which plays an important role in our analysis, 
is too strong. In our technical discussion, we do indeed interpret this requirement quite 
demandingly, as the conjunction of a “universal domain” condition and a “collective 
rationality” condition. The former requires the group’s aggregation function to admit as 
input any possible profile of individual attitudes towards the propositions on the agenda 
(subject only to individual rationality constraints). The latter requires it to produce as 
output consistent and complete group attitudes on those propositions. Both requirements 
can be challenged, and relaxations of each requirement have been studied extensively in 
the literature on judgment aggregation, including in some of our own previous work (for 
a survey of that literature, see List forthcoming). This is, however, an aspect on which we 
may not have put enough emphasis in the book.  
 
Universal domain can be interpreted as a requirement of “robustness to pluralism” (List 
2011). It demands that the group’s organizational structure be able to cope with any level 
of diversity among its members’ attitudes, subject at most to the constraints of individual 
rationality. Now, in some groups or environments we may have reasons to expect 
individual attitudes to be more cohesive or homogeneous, for instance, when member 
preferences are likely to be “single-peaked”, or member judgments “unidimensionally 
aligned”. We can then get away with requiring less “robustness to pluralism” of the 
group’s organizational structure, and still expect a rational collective performance. In 
other cases, because of a greater level of diversity among the members’ preferences and 
judgments, a stronger robustness requirement may be needed.  
 
A good analogue is the case of building regulations in different places. In California, 
which is an earthquake-prone region, buildings have to obey stronger robustness 
requirements than in London, although the underlying desideratum – stability of 
buildings in actual and relevant counterfactual circumstances – is the same. The only 
difference lies in our empirical premises about the possibility and probability of various 
circumstances, such as earthquakes in the case of buildings and differences in opinion in 
the case of aggregation. 
 
What this shows is that while we would not want to give up the “robustness” idea 
underlying the “robust group rationality” requirement, there may be a case for adjusting 
its strength to different environments and contexts, so as to demand an unrestricted 
domain of admissible inputs to the group’s aggregation function in some cases while 
admitting domain restrictions in others (for a related discussion of empirical 
circumstances and institutional design, see List 2007).  
 
Similar remarks can be made about the completeness requirement that we have taken 
“robust group rationality” to entail. In the book, we have suggested that complete attitude 
formation, at least on those propositions that have been placed on the agenda for 
adjudication, is a necessary condition for a group’s agential performance (completeness 
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on propositions outside the agenda is obviously not required). But here, too, we recognize 
some room for relaxation. As also noted in our reply to Cariani, the theory of judgment 
aggregation, on which we draw, provides all the relevant resources for modeling the case 
of incomplete attitude formation. So while we defend the central idea that “robust group 
rationality” is a condition for group agency, we accept that the level of robustness that is 
required, and the strength of the relevant rationality requirements (e.g., whether they 
should include both consistency and completeness, or just some weaker demands) may be 
adjusted from case to case. 
 
A critic might ask whether the present remarks weaken or even undermine our case 
against the general feasibility of propositionwise supervenience relations between 
individual and group attitudes. Although the relaxation of “robust group rationality” may 
complicate some of our formal arguments, a careful review of the theory of judgment 
aggregation reveals that, even when the conditions leading to the most sweeping 
impossibility results are lifted, the possibilities of aggregation consistent with 
propositionwise supervenience (technically, “independence”) are extremely limited and 
exclude some of the most natural methods of aggregation (from various “sequential” and 
“distance-based” procedures in the case of judgment aggregation, to familiar procedures 
such as the Borda count or the Kemeny method in the case of preference aggregation – let 
alone various methods involving reflective equilibrium). We conclude, therefore, that our 
central findings stand. 
 
Gaus’s second specific criticism is that our judgment-aggregation analysis “is only of 
relevance if a group regularly confronts decisions where [the individuals] disagree about 
the truth of the relevant propositions but the relations among the propositions have an 
agreed-upon logical structure”; he calls this the “proposition pluralism/structure monism” 
assumption. Here our response is that no such assumption – or at most a very minimal 
assumption – is needed.  
 
Gaus’s argument seems to be driven by his focus on the premise-based procedure, which 
he, in turn, applies to one of the original examples of a “discursive dilemma”. In this 
example, all individuals agree that two premises, say ‘p’ and ‘q’, are jointly necessary 
and sufficient for a conclusion ‘r’. So everyone accepts the background constraint ‘r if 
and only if (p and q)’. Individuals disagree, at most, on the truth-values of ‘p’, ‘q’, and 
‘r’. This is a clear instance of “proposition pluralism/structure monism”.  
 
But one key respect in which the theory of judgment aggregation sketched in List and 
Pettit (2002) and employed in the book moved beyond previous analyses of such 
examples was to formulate a model in which individuals can have divergent views on any 
set of propositions, including both “atomic” propositions such as ‘p’, ‘q’, and ‘r’ and 
“compound” propositions such as ‘r if and only if (p and q)’ or indeed any proposition 
about the relationship between other propositions. The only structure that needs to be 
held fixed is that of the underlying logic, but this can be extremely permissive. As 
Dietrich (2007) has shown, the by-now standard analysis of judgment aggregation can be 
given for any logic satisfying three minimal conditions (“self-entailment”, 
“monotonicity”, and “completability”). So the only residual “structure monism” that is 
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required for our analysis is the one tied to the acceptance of the underlying logic, which 
should hardly be surprising. People can disagree about almost anything while sharing a 
common language and logic in which their divergent views can be expressed. It is only 
the existence of the latter that we need to assume for our analysis. 
 
In conclusion, we would like to comment on a final theme raised by Gaus – that of group 
emotions. This is something on which we have said little in our book, though in Chapter 
9 we talk somewhat metaphorically about the “character” and “soul” of a group. We 
agree with Gaus that the nature of group emotions is an interesting subject for further 
investigation, and all we would like to mention here is what our preferred methodology 
for this investigation would be. In line with our general approach, we think that group 
emotions are best analyzed in a functionalist manner: as states of the group agent – in 
analogy with the case of an individual agent – that play a certain functional role. Of 
course, different accounts of what that functional role is are possible.  
 
Gaus seems to assume, however, that any group emotion must be a fairly straightforward 
function of member emotions. In his example of a committee decision on the 
wrongfulness of bribery in business he concludes that “[t]he group will have made the 
normative judgment [that certain business operations involve wrongdoing], but in ways 
approaching the young child and the psychopath, [where] the relevant emotional response 
is absent; [a majority of committee members] do not experience any such emotion, as 
they do not believe both premises.”  
 
Although we share Gaus’s concern that some group agents – for instance, some 
commercial corporations – may exhibit certain behavioural patterns usually associated 
with psychopathy (see also Bakan 2004), we think that, from a theoretical perspective, 
the conclusion that group emotions must always be a straightforward function of member 
emotions is a little too quick. Just as the supervenience relationship between the group’s 
preferences and judgments and the contributions of its members can be complex, so there 
is no a-priori reason why a group’s emotions should be a simple function of individual 
emotions. And even if they were, this would require further argument and could not 
simply be assumed. Group agency, as we hope to have shown, is a complex social 
phenomenon that cannot easily be reduced to the individual level, and group emotions 
may well share that complexity. 
 
Reply to Cariani 
 
Fabrizio Cariani focuses on the epistemological aspects of the book and particularly the 
material in Chapter 4. He is sympathetic to the broad framework developed in that 
chapter and towards the underlying epistemological research programme, which proceeds 
by acknowledging the possibility of collective doxastic agents and investigating their 
properties. But he thinks that some of our more specific epistemological claims require 
reorientation or further development. Cariani begins by offering his own reconstruction 
of some central points from Chapter 4 and then raises six objections: First, our declared 
aim to arrive merely at possibility results about a group’s epistemic capacities is too 
weak. Secondly, the ways in which we conceptualize truth-tracking and truth-indicating 
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in a group agent do not offer sufficiently clear measures for comparing the epistemic 
properties of different aggregation functions. Thirdly, our analysis is unduly biased 
towards aggregation functions that disallow incomplete collective judgments. Fourthly, 
the notion of a group agent’s indicating reliability on a given proposition does not play 
the conceptual role we want it to play. Fifthly, the framework for generalizing 
Condorcet’s jury theorem to complex, multi-proposition aggregation problems 
incorrectly presupposes that “the probability that an agent (individual or collective) will 
get all of the salient propositions right is simply determined by the reliabilities on each 
premise.” And finally, the weighted majoritarian approach that we mention in relation to 
decision problems with heterogeneous individual competence levels is unsatisfactory. 
  
We appreciate Cariani’s thoughtful discussion of the epistemological programme 
proposed in our book, though we find that some of his objections attribute to the book – 
or extrapolate from it – somewhat stronger claims than we intended to make. In this 
reply, we briefly comment on each of Cariani’s objections, and indicate where we agree 
with his call for further development, and where we think he may have been misled by 
taking our claims to be stronger than intended. 
 
Let us begin with Cariani’s first objection. Our aim in Chapter 4 is to formulate an 
epistemic desideratum that a group agent – indeed, any agent – must meet in order to 
function well in its environment, and to investigate how, if it all, a group agent can meet 
this desideratum. Our goal is to arrive at possibility results: we identify some salient 
organizational design strategies, which we call “democratization”, “decomposition”, and 
“decentralization”, that may, in principle, strengthen a group agent’s performance with 
respect to the given desideratum. The examples of concrete organizational designs that 
we discuss, however, are purely illustrative and not exhaustive. As we point out: 
 
“Whether or not each of these design principles [i.e., democratization, 
decomposition, and decentralization] is helpful, and to what extent, depends on 
the group agent and epistemic task in question, and there may not be a ‘one size 
fits all’ organizational design that is best for all group agents and all epistemic 
tasks. But the mere possibility of the three types of benefits reinforces the 
potential of epistemic gains through group agency” (GA, 102-103). 
 
We still think this passage captures our aim accurately. It may be a modest aim, but it is 
still an important one. The idea that some groups can constitute doxastic agents in their 
own right that are capable of tracking, as well as indicating, the truth in the beliefs they 
collectively form is not yet the established orthodoxy, and hence any possibility results of 
the kind we present matter.  
 
Cariani says that “if the possibility result were the only goal of the chapter, I would 
happily declare myself convinced of it by a relatively small subset of L&P’s arguments”, 
and goes on to say that “for [some of the more detailed] discussion to be relevant, [L&P] 
must be aiming for something more ambitious”. He then suggests that, over and above 
defending a group agent’s possibility of meeting the epistemic desideratum, we might 
also be claiming, firstly, that “the cases of which the assumptions [i.e., those discussed in 
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Chapter 4] hold true are in some sense especially significant”, and secondly, that “as we 
increase the class of circumstances that we consider, the results are sufficiently robust to 
give us optimism about the epistemic value of pooling information in groups”. He is 
sympathetic to the second claim but skeptical of the first.  
 
We are, however, not committed to either of these claims in unqualified form, and to the 
first one even less than to the second. As we emphasize in the book, real-world group 
agents and the decision problems they face are much more complex than any simple 
formal model can capture, and the usefulness of formal models and results of the kind 
presented in Chapter 4 lies merely in drawing our attention to certain possibilities and 
patterns in particularly distilled form. For this reason, the aggregation functions and 
hypothetical group agents we discuss to illustrate the organizational design strategies of 
“democratization”, “decomposition”, and “decentralization” are simplified ideal types, 
and real-world applications of the same organizational design strategies will no doubt 
take more complex forms, whose empirical details require further investigation. 
 
Cariani’s second objection is that our conceptualization of truth-tracking and truth-
indication in a group agent does not provide sufficiently clear measures for comparing 
the epistemic properties of different aggregation functions. He says: “It is not clear how 
the reliability analysis should ground comparisons among rules”. In response, we would 
like to make both a concession and a clarification. The definitions of truth-tracking and 
truth-indication given in Chapter 4 are indeed insufficient by themselves to yield a fully 
fledged ranking of different aggregation functions in an order of epistemic strength. But 
there are two important things to note here.  
 
First, defining the concepts of truth-tracking and truth-indication is not the same as 
devising a practical measure of each; the latter task goes well beyond the former. To give 
an analogy, it is one thing to define the concept of knowledge (an epistemological task); 
it is another to devise a practical measure of how knowledgeable a given agent is (a more 
psychological task). Our focus in Chapter 4 has been on the former, conceptual exercise, 
rather than the latter, measurement one. At best, the definitions of truth-tracking and 
truth-indication that we give suggest some heuristics for comparing different 
organizational designs, and it is only in this weaker spirit that we employ them. Secondly, 
the units of epistemic comparison must be fully constituted group agents or 
organizational structures relative to a specific set of individuals with a specific individual 
reliability profile. Aggregation functions taken in isolation cannot be assessed 
epistemically, since their epistemic performance depends crucially on the reliability and 
epistemic performance of the individuals whose judgments are being aggregated. The 
same aggregation function can perform well in one group, and badly in another. 
 
Cariani discusses some proposals on how the epistemic performance of different 
aggregation functions could be compared, relative to a given set of assumptions about 
how reliable the individuals are. We welcome Cariani’s call for further work on this 
measurement problem, and wish to emphasize just two points. First, the ranking of 
different organizational designs in an order of epistemic strength may depend not just on 
their reliability properties, but also on some other objectives, for instance the costs of 
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different types of error. As noted in Chapter 4, when false positives and false negatives 
are equally costly, majority rule may epistemically outperform unanimity or 
supermajority rules, but when there is an asymmetry between these two types of error – 
say, false positives are more costly than false negatives – this ranking may be reversed. 
Secondly, it is often difficult to capture the epistemic performance of a given 
organizational design in terms of a single summary figure, such as Cariani’s measure of 
“global competence”. Since this measure is an average of a group’s reliability across 
different circumstances, with each circumstance weighted by its probability of 
occurrence, the measure is highly sensitive to the assumed base rate of different 
circumstances. To see why this is problematic, take our example of a medical advisory 
panel that always certifies the safety of any chemical under investigation, regardless of 
the chemical’s actual risks (GA, Chapter 4.1). So long as the base rate of dangerous 
chemicals is relatively low, the panel’s “global competence” could be quite high, despite 
the panel’s low negative truth-tracking reliability. This is the reason why, contrary to 
Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006), we insist on presenting judgmental reliability 
information on a given proposition always as a pair consisting of both a positive and a 
negative reliability, rather than just as a single average figure. 
 
Cariani’s third objection is that our analysis is unduly biased towards complete 
aggregation functions, i.e., aggregation functions that disallow indecision on any 
proposition on the agenda. We may indeed have misled readers by putting a lot of 
emphasis on the case of complete collective judgments, due to our focus on agents who 
are constrained to form attitudes on at least those propositions that are placed on the 
agenda (evidently, incompleteness on propositions not on the agenda is no problem). 
However, the theory of judgment aggregation, on which the book draws, has explored the 
case of incomplete collective judgments in detail, beginning with our own initial paper 
(List and Pettit 2002, Section 4) and subsequently in Gärdenfors (2006), Dietrich and List 
(2007, 2008, forthcoming), and Dokow and Holzman (2010). We have just not 
emphasized that aspect of the theory of judgment aggregation in the book. Nonetheless, it 
is important to stress that our reliability analysis in Chapter 4 is not by itself biased 
against incomplete aggregation functions. To see this, recall that the costs of different 
types of error may enter our assessment of an agent’s epistemic performance. Now 
consider the case of an expert panel whose credibility depends on avoiding the assertion 
of falsehoods. It may well be appropriate for such a panel to use a (symmetrical) 
supermajority rule whereby it collectively accepts only those propositions that command 
a strong supermajoritarian support among the experts. In this case, the group’s epistemic 
performance is optimized by an aggregation function that frequently delivers incomplete 
collective judgments. 
 
Cariani’s fourth objection concerns the notion of indicating reliability. We define an 
agent’s positive indicating reliability on a proposition ‘p’ as the conditional probability 
that ‘p’ is true given that the agent judges that p, and the negative indicating reliability as 
the conditional probability that ‘p’ is false given that the agent doesn’t judge that p. We 
also point out that an agent’s positive, or negative, indicating reliability can be naturally 
interpreted as the probability that an outside observer is entitled to assign to ‘p’ on 
learning that the agent has, or has not, judged that p. Cariani challenges this 
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interpretation, arguing that the outside observer should look not just at what the agent 
has, or has not, judged, but also – at least in the case of a group – at the breakdown of 
individual votes leading to the relevant collective judgment. We don’t deny that, when 
the breakdown of individual votes is publicly available, these votes may carry some 
information, and an observer’s Bayesian belief update should take that into account. 
Indeed, drawing on earlier work in List (2004), we state a formula in Chapter 4 that 
captures the conditional probability that ‘p’ is true, given a particular pattern of votes for 
and against ‘p’, under Condorcetian assumptions.  
 
However, just as the neural processes leading to an individual’s belief formation are 
usually opaque to an outside observer, so the individual-level history of a group agent’s 
judgments may often be opaque to the outside world, either in practice or even by design. 
We take an agential stance towards the collective system as a whole, and when we assess 
the truth-tracking and truth-indicating abilities it possesses as an integrated unit, the 
definitions of truth-tracking and truth-indication, initially defined for an individual agent, 
apply naturally to the collective as well. Even in cases in which the group members’ 
voting pattern is public, we may still be interested in the indicating reliability of the group 
agent as a whole. For example, we have good normative reasons to be interested in the 
indicating reliability of the Supreme Court as a whole, and not just in the information 
carried by the individual judges’ votes. 
 
Cariani’s fifth objection is that “[t]he framework for generalizing the Condorcet-style 
analysis to complex aggregation problems assumes that the probability that an agent 
(individual or collective) will get all of the salient propositions right is simply determined 
by the reliabilities on each premise” – let us call this the “compositionality assumption” – 
and this “seems to [him] to be relatively uncommon”. We agree with Cariani that an 
agent’s probability of making correct judgments on all relevant propositions is not always 
a function of the agent’s positive and negative reliabilities on some relevant premises. 
Even fairly simple factors such as stochastic dependencies between someone’s judgments 
on different premises could undermine the compositionality assumption. Furthermore, the 
agenda of propositions under consideration need not be neatly divisible into a set of 
epistemically prior premises and a set of epistemically subordinate conclusions. Nothing 
in our approach to formulating the epistemic desideratum, or in our suggestion that 
democratization, decomposition, and decentralization are ideal-typical strategies for 
improving a group’s epistemic performance, hinges on the compositionality assumption. 
We are not committed to that assumption and agree with Cariani that it is not generally 
true. He is right, of course, that, without compositionality, a Condorcetian analysis of a 
group’s truth-tracking ability in multi-proposition cases becomes more complicated, and 
there is certainly scope for further work here. 
 
Cariani’s final objection concerns the remarks we make about weighted majority voting 
in the case of heterogenous individual reliability. We mention in Chapter 4 that even 
when one of the jury theorem’s central assumptions – namely that all individuals are 
equally competent on a given proposition – is violated, a weighted form of majority 
voting can still epistemically outperform a dictatorship or other exclusionary decision 
method. To make this point, we invoke the statistical result that weighted majority voting 
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maximizes the group’s positive and negative tracking reliability if each individual’s vote 
is given a weight proportional to the log-likelihood ratio associated with the individual’s 
reliability (e.g., Grofman, Owen, and Feld 1983, Ben-Yashar and Nitzan 1997). Cariani 
finds this an unsatisfactory “solution” to the problem of heterogenous competence. But it 
was never meant to be a practical solution. Again, we presented the result as a possibility 
result: to show that even the relaxation of some of the idealized assumptions of 
Condorcet’s jury theorem does not rule out the in-principle availability of the 
epistemically advantageous organizational design strategies identified in the chapter, here 
the strategy of democratization. We completely agree with Cariani, however, that the 
practical question of how to make collective judgments in cases of heterogenous 
competence – especially when the competence levels of different individuals are opaque 
or even normatively deemed irrelevant – is a difficult question that requires further 
research. 
 
Reply to Sylvan 
 
Kurt Sylvan goes along with the realism about group agents that we defend but 
challenges our claim that this realism turns group agents, and their attitudes, into non-
redundant posits of common sense, social science, and normative theory. In responding to 
his challenge, we look first at what it means to claim non-redundancy for these posits and 
then consider Sylvan’s argument. While we end up holding our ground, we appreciate the 
opportunity to consider his interesting and novel challenge; it raises some great issues. 
 
The non-redundancy claim in Group Agency involves two points. First, the attitudes we 
ascribe to a group agent are “not readily reducible” to the attitudes of members (GA, 5): 
that is, talk about them is not “readily translatable into individualistic terms” (GA, 6). 
And second, the ascription of such attitudes gives us a “distinctive way of understanding 
and relating” to the group; it enables us “to interact with it, criticize it, and make demands 
on it, in a manner not possible with a non-agential system” (GA, 5-6). According to the 
theory developed, there is nothing in a group’s counting as an agent that is not 
supervenient on the attitudes and acts of the members, just as, according to physicalism, 
there is nothing in an individual’s counting as an agent that is not supervenient on its 
physical constitution. But still, our theory implies that the move to recognizing a group as 
an agent gives us a novel perspective of the kind that many physicalists associate with 
seeing a material system as an intentional agent. In each case, “the new perspective 
enables us to see higher-level regularities” and “to respond to the system … in abstraction 
from much of what happens at the lower level” (GA, 6).  
 
There is no clean divide between redundant and non-redundant forms of realism about 
entities that are composed out of other entities, as group agents are composed out of 
members and individual agents out of physical states. Towards one end of the spectrum 
there are realist theories according to which reduction or translation from the higher to 
the lower level is easy and the response capacity associated with the higher stance does 
not strictly require that perspective. Towards the other end are realist theories according 
to which the reduction is harder and the response capacity supported by the higher stance 
is more or less exclusively tied to it. Towards the first extreme, intuitively, there must 
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exist a workable, if complex, recipe for determining on the basis of lower-level 
information when it is appropriate to make higher-level attributions; towards the second, 
no such recipe is in sight. Citing problems that raise mounting difficulties for reduction 
(GA, 77-78), we argue that our theory of group agency lies towards this latter end.  
 
Perhaps miscued by some of our remarks, Sylvan treats the question of whether certain 
posits are redundant as an on-off matter rather than one of degree. And he sets the bar for 
non-redundancy quite high, arguing that the issue is whether there is “an uncloseable 
explanatory gap” between the lower and the higher levels of discourse, where that gap is 
of the kind physicalists generally acknowledge as a problem for making physical sense of 
consciousness (though not of intentionality). He invokes a comment we make on parallels 
with the discussion of consciousness (GA, 75) to suggest that we take the same view of 
the nature of the issue. But we differ with him on these matters. We think that whether a 
theory counts as introducing redundant or non-redundant posits is a matter of degree, and 
we do not think it depends on whether there is an explanatory gap of the kind discussed 
in the consciousness literature.  
 
We now put aside these differences about how to construe the issue between redundant 
and non-redundant realism and turn to Sylvan’s claim that we have not established 
anything that might deserve to be called a non-redundant realism. According to our 
theory, the beliefs of a group agent in a set of propositions need not be determined, 
proposition by proposition, on the basis of the individual beliefs of a majority of 
members in those propositions (or in the appropriateness of the group’s believing them). 
Nor, more generally, need they be derivable by any systematic, propositionwise function 
from the individual beliefs of members. It is this “autonomy” of group beliefs (or 
attitudes in general) that lies behind our claim that group agents should be regarded as 
agents in their own right, with attitudinal sets that may be strikingly autonomous from the 
attitude sets of their members.  
 
While accepting this core thesis, Sylvan concentrates on its illustration under an 
inflexible premise-based mode of aggregating judgments. Under a premise-based 
procedure, the members of a group treat certain mutually independent propositions as 
premises, collectively endorsing them if and only if they command majority support. But 
when it comes to a proposition, ‘p’, entailed by the premises that they have already 
endorsed, the group is prepared collectively to endorse ‘p’ even when it turns out not to 
enjoy majority support: even perhaps when everyone disbelieves it. The possibility of a 
logically derived but individually unsupported group belief in a proposition like ‘p’ 
illustrates (but is only one among many possible illustrations of) how a group belief in a 
proposition need not be a majoritarian function — nor, more generally, any other 
function — of the beliefs of members in the same proposition. 
 
In our book we dismiss the premise-based procedure as a satisfactory way of organizing a 
group agent on the grounds that, first, it presupposes that members can agree on what 
should count as premises and, second, it does not permit a group to reconsider any 
premise-beliefs as a result of seeing the conclusions that would follow from them (GA, 
60-62). In more plausible and workable group agents, the organizational structure will 
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allow any proposition, however long endorsed, to be rejected on grounds of 
inconsistency. And it may admit different modes of determination for different kinds of 
proposition, authorize different subgroups to specialize in determining the group’s beliefs 
on different issues, and rely on any of a range of devices to ensure that the group’s 
overall beliefs are coherent. Arrangements of this sort are familiar from everyday bodies 
like companies and churches, voluntary associations, trade unions, and political parties. 
 
Acknowledging that group agents are liable to have novel attitude sets, and can count as 
agents in their own right, Sylvan argues that nonetheless there is a ready reduction of any 
group belief (or analogously, group preference) in an individually unsupported 
conclusion — say, ‘p’, in our example — despite the fact that the belief does not reflect 
the members’ individual beliefs in ‘p’. In a case like this, as he puts it at one point, the 
group belief that p “is constituted by a pattern of members accepting it qua members” — 
that is, by their treating it as true “for group purposes” — at least where this pattern is a 
matter of common knowledge. And holding that in this sense “group belief plausibly 
boils down to neat patterns of individualistic facts”, he thinks that our realism about 
group agents falls on the redundant side of the spectrum.  
 
But this argument depends on the assumption that there is a relevant parallel between the 
way an individually supported group belief in a proposition relates to member beliefs in 
that proposition and the way an individually unsupported group belief in a proposition 
relates to member acceptance of the proposition. The idea is that just as underlying 
member belief would make the first sort of group belief unsurprising, so underlying 
member acceptance would make the second sort of group belief equally unsurprising. But 
the suggested parallel is spurious and does not establish that group attitudes and agents 
are readily reducible to individualistic facts. 
 
Everything a group does, it does by means of individuals, no matter what structure it has; 
it is a superordinate entity in which individuals are the only moving parts. Thus when a 
group comes to form a belief, individually supported or not, it is essential that relevant 
members accept it. More specifically, those who are authorized to perform in a judging 
role must assent in the name of the group to that proposition, and those who are 
authorized to perform in executive roles (they may or may not be the same individuals) 
must be led to act on the proposition in the name of the group. These executive members 
have to act in their respective roles as if the proposition is true but they need not 
personally assent to it; provided their action fits with the general pattern required of the 
group, they may be guided only by unexplained cues or instructions.2 
 
This observation shows that in the role-based sense of acceptance in which it means 
treating a proposition as true for group purposes, the relevant members – those enacting 
the group attitudes – have to accept all the propositions the group believes, individually 
supported or not, whether in the sense of assenting to these propositions or merely acting 
on them. But this does not mean that the group beliefs can easily be reduced to – or 
                                                
2 With some propositions that members accept, as in the propositions corresponding to rules of inference 
that they never spell out, the only mode of acceptance on anyone’s part will be the executive. Lewis Carroll 
(1895) shows that there have to be some such rules and some such propositions. 
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reductively explained in terms of – the pattern of role-based member acceptances of these 
propositions. While all of a group agent’s beliefs require the relevant acceptance of 
relevant members, not all have to be a majoritarian or other function of any member 
beliefs in their contents. It is this aspect of group agency that we stress in arguing that 
while all the attitudes of a group agent have to be supervenient on the contributions of 
members — and can be supervenient on any of a variety of contributory profiles — only 
some can satisfy the sort of reducibility that would obtain under a majoritarian or other 
propositionwise function.  
 
Were the beliefs of a group agent a simple function — say, a majoritarian function — of 
the members’ beliefs in the relevant propositions, then the recipe for attributing group 
belief would be entirely clear: let a majority of members believe any proposition, and the 
group counts as believing it. But knowing that the beliefs of a group have to be a function 
of the acceptance that members give to those propositions offers us no such recipe. Put in 
somewhat oversimplified terms, it is the group belief that explains the role-based member 
acceptance, not the role-based member acceptance that explains the group belief. And so 
the individualistic information about acceptance does not offer a base for the ready 
reduction of group attitudes. To quote from Rachael Briggs’s commentary, it directs us to 
“a complicated and disjunctive proposition about a wide range of individual attitudes”.  
 
A little reflection makes clear why this is so. In order to know that members accept a 
certain proposition we must know who assents to it on behalf of the group and who acts 
on it in the name of the group. In order to move from knowledge of such member 
acceptance to knowledge about a putative group belief we must know that this pattern is 
one that fits with the organizational structure under which members operate: it is relevant 
members, for example, who give relevant forms of acceptance. And in order to know that 
the group actually believes the proposition — that it meets the functional specifications 
on belief — we must know that the structure allows the group to perform as an agent, 
letting the putative belief serve in the role proper to belief. The individualistic knowledge 
base required for determining group beliefs and other attitudes is just too complex to 
allow anything that could count as a ready reduction.  
 
In developing his challenge, Sylvan chides us for not paying more attention to the 
literature on joint intention and action on the grounds that various writers in that tradition 
offer more or less individualistic recipes for when to ascribe a joint intention to a 
collection of individuals to pursue various actions and effects together, including the 
effect of endorsing a proposition in common. As the book stresses, however, we think 
that our enterprise presupposes that there is an acceptable account of what it is to act on a 
joint intention and does not need to compete with the established accounts in this area; 
here we can simply rely on the rich existing literature. We concentrate on the distinct 
topic of what is needed if people are to act together (in the normal case, on the basis of a 
joint intention) so as to constitute an agent with the capacity for rational coherence and 
interpersonal answerability that human agency requires.  
 
In particular, we are interested in how people can do this, given that coherence and 
answerability rules out relying on any systematic, propositionwise function from 
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individual to group attitudes. We think that we have established the possibility of group 
agency in this sense, a point on which Sylvan agrees. But we also think that our account 
rules out the prospect of a workable recipe for using individualistic information alone to 
determine when it is appropriate to ascribe this or that attitude to a group agent. The 
group agents that people routinely posit in common sense, in social science, and in 
normative theory are not only real entities; they are also posits that no plausible, 
accessible recipe can render redundant. 
 
Reply to Briggs  
 
Rachael Briggs is broadly sympathetic to the viewpoint of the book, and her piece 
consists mainly in some useful clarifications and some virtuoso developments of a 
number of ideas. She makes clearer than perhaps we did that in discussing the 
responsibilities and rights of group agents, we are focusing on the responsibilities and 
rights they ought to be given under established conventions: under social norms and laws. 
She identifies the sort of argument that ought to be made in favor of the normative 
individualism that we take for granted: this is, roughly, the thesis that in determining 
suitable norms and laws we ought to consult the interests of individual human beings, not 
group agents. She challenges our contention that such a normative individualism is 
needed for putting a limit on the rights of group agents. And she develops an alternative 
response to the objection that groups can’t be in control of the things they do because 
members are already in control, and hence that groups cannot be held responsible. Our 
response in the book relies on Jackson and Pettit’s model of programme explanation; 
Briggs develops a response based on the work of List and Menzies on difference-making 
causation.  
 
In this reply to her commentary, we focus mainly on the issue of corporate rights and 
responsibilities, but we should first make a brief comment on an early remark to the 
effect that we provide only “an argument that group agents are possible, not an argument 
that group agents exist”. The point may not be very important given, as Briggs notes, that 
it is “overwhelmingly likely that group agents exist to fill the conceptual space … carved 
out”. But it may be useful to clarify what the book claims on this front.  
 
We sketch an argument for the existence of group agents in the following passage from 
the end of Part I, omitting a crucial empirical premise.  
 
“Let a collection of individuals form and act on a single, robustly rational body of 
attitudes, whether by dint of a joint intention or on some other basis, and it will be 
an agent. The argument of the second and third chapters shows that despite the 
difficulties of aggregation, it is possible for collections of individuals to 
coordinate their individual contributions so as to achieve this level of functioning. 
Hence group agents exist.” (GA, 75) 
 
The missing premise is, of course, that as a matter of empirical fact there are collections 
of individuals who do form and act on suitable bodies of attitudes. That premise we 
mostly take for granted in the book, though we provide some anecdotal support for it in 
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our brief overview of the variety of attitudinally organized groups, political, commercial 
and civic, that are recognized in common sense and in social science (GA, Chapter 1).   
 
We recognize that our book does not primarily focus on this empirical premise and that in 
our discussion of ontology, in the first part of the book, we look mainly at the possibility 
of group agents. Furthermore, when the book discusses the design and status of group 
agents, our interest is primarily in laying out the conceptual territory rather than in 
empirically mapping various real-world group agents and their capacities. Thus we 
entirely agree with Briggs’s comment that there is a need for further empirical 
“investigation into the actual dynamics of group reasoning to establish which agential 
capacities groups have, and how group attitudes relate to the attitudes of group 
members”. 
  
Turning now to the issue of corporate responsibilities and rights, the first thing to note is 
that, as Briggs observes, we take the view that “there is every reason to hold [group 
agents] responsible in their own right”, but that they should “have restricted rights as 
compared with individuals” (GA, 182). In other words, there is a difference between the 
way we treat groups as the bearers of responsibilities and the way we treat them as the 
bearers of rights. As Briggs puts it, on this account, “there is an important asymmetry 
between obligations and rights”.  
 
We now feel that our comments in the book on this kind of asymmetry may be somewhat 
misleading. In discussing responsibilities, we argue that a group agent is fit to be held 
responsible for what it does in its own name, but we do not pay much attention to the 
range of responsibilities that it ought to be given: the range of actions for which it is fit to 
be held responsible. In discussing rights, on the other hand, we take for granted that 
group agents are fit to be given rights in their own name — that is, rights over and above 
the rights accruing to members — and focus rather on the range of rights they should be 
given. We might, however, also express the view by saying that group agents are both fit 
to be held responsible and fit to be given rights in their own name, but that there are 
serious limitations on the rights they should be given — as, presumably, there are some 
limitations on the responsibilities they can plausibly have.  
 
Briggs considers our arguments for why group agents are fit to be given responsibilities 
and rights, elaborating in a useful way on the various considerations that are relevant to 
this. On fitness to be held responsible, she observes that we might have drawn on the 
work of List and Menzies on difference-making causation in order to counter the 
objection that it is members, not groups, that have control of what groups do; this is a 
point we are aware of, but didn’t develop in the book. And, adding some further 
observations of her own, she endorses the argument we provide for why group agents 
satisfy the different conditions associated with being fit to be held responsible for a given 
action.  
 
Addressing a group agent’s fitness to be given rights, Briggs focuses on the performative 
conception of persons that we adopt, according to which, in her words, “to be a person is 
to be capable of the understanding and competence required for participation in a social 
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contract”. While she thinks that it may be better to adopt “an interest-based conception of 
personhood”, she acknowledges in our defense that “[t]his knowledge and understanding 
make it appropriate to grant conventional rights to an agent”, including a group agent. Let 
a group agent be capable, as we argue, of being “party to a system of accepted 
convention, such as a system of law” (GA, 173) — specifically, a “knowledgeable and 
competent” party to the system — and it is clearly capable of having rights: that is, 
capable of enjoying, recognizing, and even invoking the protection of certain choices that 
any relevant system of convention or law will provide.  
 
We have been discussing a group agent’s fitness to be held responsible and its fitness to 
bear rights. Turning now to the other question that arises in each case, what range of 
responsibilities and rights ought a group agent to be given? In our book, we do not 
explicitly address the range of responsibilities in question, taking for granted that it will 
make sense to assign responsibilities to a group agent only in the domain where it is 
equipped to form and act on attitudes – that is, where it meets the conditions for fitness to 
be held responsible. But we say in passing that the question can be resolved consistently 
with the same normatively individualist basis as the range-of-rights question, remarking 
that our views on both sides “make sense within the perspective of normative 
individualism” (GA, 182).  
 
Briggs’s main challenge arises at this point. Our normative individualism suggests that in 
determining what responsibilities and rights a group agent ought to be given, we should 
look only to the interests of human beings: “something is good only if it is good for 
individual human or, more generally, sentient beings” (GA, 182). She takes the 
discussion to a deeper level, however, in distinguishing the different interests of 
individual human beings that might be invoked; in arguing that there are counterparts to 
those interests at the level of group agents; in suggesting that there are grounds for taking 
such group interests into account as well; and finally in maintaining that consistently with 
doing this we may still be able to stick with the restrictions we support on the rights that 
ought to be given to group agents.  
 
Briggs follows Parfit in arguing that something may be good for an agent — for short, 
may be in that agent’s interest — in virtue of its affecting the agent’s hedonic 
satisfaction, the fulfillment of the agent’s desires and plans, or the agent’s enjoyment of 
certain allegedly objective goods like knowledge, friendship, or freedom. She then 
maintains that on our realist theory, group agents as well as individual agents may be 
capable of having interests of these three kinds. We agree with her that group agents may 
have interests of the last two kinds, but we remain agnostic about the possibility of 
interests of the first kind. Briggs claims that “it’s not so obvious that there couldn’t be a 
group that felt pain”. While we have certainly argued that group agents can have 
relatively autonomous intentional states, which are not easily reducible to the members’ 
corresponding states, it is an open question whether group agents could also have hedonic 
states, and if so, whether these could ever go beyond something that is straightforwardly 
reducible to the corresponding states of members.  
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Still, given that group agents do have interests of non-hedonic kinds, the question is why 
these shouldn’t weigh against the interests of individuals in determining what is for the 
best in social life: in particular, what allocation of corporate rights and responsibilities is 
for the best. Our statement of normative individualism suggests that the interests of group 
agents count for nothing, but as Briggs makes clear, this is far from obvious. They might 
count equally with the interests of individuals, they might count but have a weaker 
weight than the interests of individuals, or they might count but only in determining the 
best candidate among arrangements that do equally well in individual terms. Were we to 
go along with the interest-based conception of persons which Briggs herself finds 
attractive, this result would be reinforced. On that view, persons are just those creatures 
“for which things can go well or badly”. We do not go along with this conception for the 
methodological reason she gives: “the interest-based conception blurs [the descriptive-
normative] distinction; the idea of interests is already a normatively, perhaps morally, 
loaded concept”. But even without an interest-based conception of personhood, it is 
certainly plausible that group agents can have interests, and it is not clear why these 
should not count at all in determining the best social arrangements.  
 
We are happy to concede to Briggs that if the interests of group agents are allowed to 
count — if normative individualism is false — the danger that group agents represent for 
the welfare of individuals, which we ourselves invoke, would still argue for giving fewer 
rights to group agents than to individuals. But is it reasonable to stick with normative 
individualism and to hold the line against her main challenge? 
 
This is a difficult question and requires far more investigation than we give it in the book, 
where we adopt normative individualism as just a plausible assumption. But there is one 
consideration that might count in favor of normative individualism and which we gesture 
at in our discussion. This is that group agents, unlike individuals, are the products of 
social arrangements and depend both for coming into existence and continuing in 
existence on the coordinated efforts of their members. “Individual persons create and 
organize group agents” (GA, 181), as we say in the book. There may seem to be 
something of a circle involved in thinking that, even when we hold the population of all 
individuals fixed, the criterion by which we should make a judgment on the best social 
arrangements involves the interests of social entities that those very arrangements bring 
into existence. It seems more natural to think that it is the interests of individuals that 
determine what sorts of rights and responsibilities group agents are to be given; 
individual agents are the producers of social arrangements, corporate agents the 
precipitates.  
 
When individuals create and sustain group agents, whether in political, commercial, or 
civic spheres, then the rights and responsibilities given to those corporate bodies have 
important repercussions for all those affected, members and non-members alike. Some 
individuals may benefit and others suffer from the form such rights and responsibilities 
assume. Whatever ethical view we adopt, it seems plausible to think that the interests of 
the individuals who stand to benefit or suffer as a result of social arrangements should 
ultimately determine the rights and responsibilities to be assigned, not the interests of the 
corporate entities that these arrangements bring into existence.  
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